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IN THE

SUPRE1\1E COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DONALD L. STEADMAN and DONNA
B. STEADMAN, his wife, and
NORMA E. STEADMAN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and M. M.
MERRILL, and LESTER M. JOHNSON and JOHNSON ENTERPRISES, INC., successors in interest,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.

10779

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a foreclosure commenced by Respondents, as
mortgagee, in 1961 and based upon two defaults by the
Appellants, as mortgagor, under a mortgage agreement.
Subsequent to the resolution of the foreclosure, further proceedings were held, on Respondents' motion, for the determination of the issue of attorneys' fees, which issue had not
been resolved in the previous hearing. The lower court
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granted Respondents' motion for attorneys' fees and it is
from that decision that the Appellants take this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Appellants' statement of facts fails to include
portions of the record which are necessary to proper consideration of the issues herein involved, Respondents make
this supplemental statement.
On April 15, 1954, Appellant Lake Hills executed a
purchase money note and mortgage in the amount of $142,200.00 which provided for installments of $15,800.00 payable on the 15th day of April 1955, and $15,800 payable on
the 15th day of each April thereafter until the total principal sum of said indebtedness was paid in full. The terms
and provisions of the note were directly incorporated into
the mortgage (R. 5). The mortgage further provided that
in addition to the payment of the fore going amounts, the
mortgagor was to pay "all taxes and assesments levied on
the said mortgaged premises * * * before delinquency
* * *" (R. 5). Finally, the mortgage provided that "in
case of default in payment of this note, we agree to pay
all costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee"
(R. 5), and that "in the event of foreclosure of this mortgage, the said mortgagor agrees to pay a reasonable attorney's fee" (R. 6).
Thereafter, a deed executed by the mortgagor was deposited with Walker Bank & Trust Company, as escrow
agent. Under the terms of the escrow instructions, it was
provided:

s
"In the event buyer shall fail to pay any of the
aforesaid installments promptly when due, or within
30 days thereafter, then upon seller's demand, you
shall deliver to said seller the aforesaid Deed whereupon your duties, responsibilities and liability of
every kind and character under the terms of this
escrow shall cease and terminate" (R. 69).
Appellants failed to make the $15,800.00 installment
payment due on or before April 15, 1961 (R. 67). Additionally, the Appellants had failed to pay taxes for the years
from 1955 through 1961 and the property had been the subject of a tax sale (R. 118). Based on the failure of Appellants to pay the annual installment and the taxes, the Respondents elected to foreclose and commenced this foreclosure on April 20, 1961 (R. 1-3). On October 3, 1961,
Salt Lake County was joined as a party defendant in the
action (R. 31) and in its answer to plaintiffs' complaint, it
was affirmatively alleged that there were delinquent and
unpaid taxes on the subject property for the years 1958,
1959, and 1960 totaling $2,167.99 and that by virtue of said
delinquent and unpaid taxes, Salt Lake County had a paramount and superior claim in the property (R. 33-34). The
matter went to trial on December 7, 1961, and on December 15, 1961, the lower court caused a minute entry to be
entered in the Register of Actions which provided "no
cause for action" conditioned on the curing of the default
(R. 48).
Subsequently, after numerous attempts had been made
by the attorneys for the Respondents to obtain formal findings of fact and conclusions of law and a formal judgment

4
in the matter, the Respondents' attorneys forwarded to the
Court proposed findings of fact which included a finding
for attorneys' fees (R. 38, 41-47). The proposed findings
of fact remained unsigned by the Court and no formal judgment was ever entered. Nevertheless, by virtue of the foreclosure, the Respondents were effectively protected, their
mortgage interest was rendered more secure, and the
amount secured by the mortgage eventually was paid in
full except for the attorneys' fees here in question.
Appellant Lake Hills filed bankruptcy pursuant to
Chapter XI of the Federal Bankruptcy Act and it was not
until September 10, 1964, that a successor-in-interest was
appointed for Lake Hills. Appellant Lake Hills' successorin-interest made the installment payments thereafter. Prior
to the last installment payment, which was due and payable
on April 15, 1966, the Respondents filed an amended and
supplemental complaint, alleging that the Appellant Lake
Hills' successor-in-interest, had agreed to pay the Respondents' attorneys' fees, but had thereafter refused to make
such payment (R. 50-52). That amended and supplemental
complaint was later dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of
the parties wherein it was agreed that the Appellants would
pay into Court the sum of $5,000.00 and that the issue of
attorneys' fees in that amount would be submitted for determination by the Court (R. 53-56).
On September 23, 1966, the issue of attorneys' fees
was presented to the Court on stipulated facts (R. 66-74).
Based on those stipulated facts and the uncontroverted
testimony adduced at the hearing that Respondents' counsel

5

had spent 192 hours on the prosecution of the foreclosure
action (R. 107), the Court awarded Respondents' attorneys
fees in the sum of $3,500.00.
On October 19, 1966, the original trial judge entered
an order nunc pro tune pursuant to a conversation had with
counsel for both parties, specifically reserving the issue of
attorneys' fees (R. 82-83).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS' FEES DEPENDS ON THE TERMS OF
THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT AND NOT ON
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION.
It is well settled in Utah that the right to an award of
attorneys' fees does not exist separate and apart from contractual or statutory provision. Hawkins v. Perry, 123
Utah 16, 253 P. 2d 372; Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 32'5 P. 2d 906. Thus,
in determining whether, as an initial proposition, attorneys'
fees may be awarded to a party, the court must look to the
terms of an applicable statute, if any, or to the terms of
the contract.

Section 78-37-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, providing
in pertinent part that * * * "In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the
amount thereof shall be fixed by the court * * *", is
not determinative of the existence of a right to attorneys'
fees but rather provides that once the right is established,

the reasonableness of the fees must be a matter for the
court to decide. There being no other statutory provisions
giving rise or denying a right to attorneys' fees, this
court must then look, as did the court below, to the terms
of the mortgage agreement to Jetermine the nature and
extent of Respondents' right.
The mortgage agreement in this instance contains two
separate stipulations by the mortgagors for the payment of
attorneys' fees (R. 5, 6). The first stipulation provides:
"In case of default in payment of this note, we
agree to pay all costs of collection including a reasonable attorneys' fee" (R. 5).
The terms and provisions of the note were incorporated
into the body of the mortgage and were thus a part thereof.
The second stipulation provides:
"In the event of foreclosure of this mortgage
the said Mortgagor agrees to pay a reasonable attorneys' fee" (R. 6).
On the face of the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor
twice undertook to pay a reasonable attorneys' fee, conditioned, disjunctively, on a "default" in the first instance
and a "foreclosure" in the other.
The prime question before the Court then is whether
one or the other, or both, of these conditions occurred. Since
the existence of default is preliminary to fore closure, they
will be treated in that order in the following discussion.
(a)

The Appellants were in default under the terms
of the Mortgage Agreement.
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Under the terms of the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor was obligated, by virtue of his covenants, to pay annual installments in the sum of $15,800.00 on or before the
15th day of April of each year until the principal and interest were paid (R. 5). Additionally, the mortgagor was obligated to pay "all taxes * * * before delinquency * * *"
(R. 5).

The record clearly illustrates that the mortgagor was
in default regarding the payment of the 1961 annual installment as required by the mortgage agreement. Appellants admitted this fact in their answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories ( R. 13, 15). They stipulated to this fact in
the Stipulated Facts (R. 67). The record likewise illustrates
that they had failed to pay taxes before delinquency for
three years (R. 33, 67). On this appeal, Appellants have
again acknowledged the fact of the default under the mortgage agreement (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3, 9). By way of
excuse, Appellants claim that the taxes were abated before
suit, but the record does not support them on this (R. 33,
34).

Thus, that the Appellants were in default under the
very terms of the mortgage agreement at the time of the
commencement of the foreclosure action, is not here an
issue nor was it below.
By way of additional excuse for the defaults, Appellants assert that an escrow agreement was executed, albeit
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, under which
a warranty deed was delivered to the escrow agent with instructions that in the event of default, under the mortgage,
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and after the expiration of thirty (30) days, the deed was
to be delivered to the mortgagee. The Appellants refer to
this thirty-day period as a "thirty-day grace period" and
assert that by virtue of the separately existing escrow
agreement, the obligations of the mortgagor under the
mortgage were rendered meaningless.
Rather than to take away the mortgagee's remedies
under the mortgage, however, the patent purpose of the
escrow arrangement was to provide the mortgagee with
an additional remedy in the event of a default. The escrow
agreement does not refer, except by implication, to the
mortgage, and does not purport to amend or alter the terms
thereof. Moreover, there is no term in the escrow agreement which limits or lessens the mortgagor's duties and
obligations under the mortgage agreement (R. 69). The
terms of neither document were dependent upon the terms
of the other, nor were the terms of either incorporated into
the other. It is well settled that subsequent documents
affect the terms of a prior mortgage agreement only where
they clearly purport so to do, or are incorporated therein
by reference. Knight v. Kitchin, 261 N. Y. S. 809; Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336.
Therefore, the mortgagee had two remedies available:
under the mortgage and note, upon default in payment of
the annual installment and taxes, the mortgage clearly had
the right to declare the full amount of the mortgage due
and owing (R. 5) and to foreclose thereon; Thompson v.
Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477; Hill v. Schultz, 71 Idaho
145, 227 P. 2d 586; Welder v. Director, 118 Cal. App. 124,

4 P. 2d 793; under the escrow agreement, if the mortgagor
failed to make the annual installment payment within thirty
days after the date of payment set forth in the mortgage
agreement, the mortgagee could, alternatively, require delivery of an already executed deed conveying the premises
to him to further protect his substantial monetary interest
therein. The purpose for such an arrangement is clear:
To provide the mortgagee with an additional remedy in the
event of default whereby he could simply and inexpensively
make himself more secure.
As a result of the two-fold default, Respondents were
required, if they were to protect their secured interest, to
enforce collection. The mortgagors' duty was obvious in
this situation - they were bound to pay all costs of collection including a reasonable attorneys' fee if they defaulted,
and their liability for those costs accrued at the commencement of the action. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe,
160 Ore. 679, 86 P. 2d 960.
It is submitted that the escrow agreement provided no

excuse for Appellants' admitted defaults, and that Appellants had objectively and explicitly breached their covenants in the mortgage agreement as of the time of commencement of the foreclosure action.
(b)

There was a "foreclosure" arising out of Appellants' defaults.

The mortgagor additionally undertook, by virtue of express provision in the mortgage agreement, to pay reasonable attorneys' fees "in the event of foreclosure". Such a
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provision "* * * is intended as an indemnity to the
mortgagee for expenditures necessarily made to protect his
interests." 1 Jones on Mortgages, §442. The law supports
such a provision for attorneys' fees on the theory that it
encourages the extension of credit while at the same time
protecting the creditor from the financial burden resulting
from the debtor's default. In this light then, an assertion,
such as that which Appellants have made - that Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees only in the event of a
foreclosure decree and sale - is contrary to the very reason
for providing for attorneys' fees by contractual arrangement. Moreover, such an assertion is contrary to the terms
of the mortgage agreement. The mortgage agreement does
not provide for payment of attorneys' fees "in the event of
a foreclosure sale;" it provides for attorneys' fees "in the
event of foreclosure." As the court said in Insurance Co.
of North America v. Cheatham, 299 S. W. '545 (Ky.):
"* * * the term 'foreclosure' is used to mean the institution of suit to enforce a lien against property. * * *"
(Emphasis supplied). For this reason, it is said that the
mortgagee's right to attorneys' fees accrues at the commencement of the foreclosure action and not at the end
end thereof. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 160 Ore.
679, 86 P. 2d 960; Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220, 176 P. 42;
59 C. J. S., Mortgages §812 (b); 1 Jones on Mortgages §442.
Moreover, the allowance of an attorneys' fee is not dependent upon the actual collection of the mortgage debt, In re
Peerless Weaving & Throwing Co., 259 Fed. 610, but rather
upon the terms of mortgage agreement, Watson v. Sawyer,
12 Wash. 35, 40 P. 413.
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While there are instances where the attorneys' fee has
not been allowed in the absence of a successful prosecution
of the foreclosure action, those instances are based either
on strict statutory requirements or on the express terms of
the mortgage agreement. See In re Ebert, 140 F. Supp.
597.
When the Respondents found themselves faced with
two defaults by Appellants, neither of which was insubstantial in light of the dollar amounts involved, they were
confronted with the necessity of instituting a foreclosure
proceeding to protect their interests. They retained counsel to accomplish this, and ultimately, this was accomplished.
The condftion for the accrual of a right to attorneys' fees
arose by virtue of the necessary and timely institution
of the foreclosure.
It should be noted in passing that while Appellants

have argued that the term "foreclosure" refers to the "end
result," their own cited authorities recognize that "foreclosure" means a "proceeding" and that the term applies ''to
the enforcement of a mortgage by any form of legal proceeding." 59 C. J. S., Mortgages §482 at 762 (Emphasis
supplied).
It is submitted that under the terms of the mortgage
agreement, "the event of foreclosure" had occurred and
that, thereupon, Respondents, as the lower court found,
were entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee.
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POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL, THE
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, AND HEARING
BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE, WERE NOT
RAISED OR OBJECTED TO AT ANY TIME
PRIOR TO THIS APPEAL, AND THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT NOW ENTITLED TO RELY
ON THE SAME.
The Appellants have not at any time prior to this appeal raised the issue of laches, the issue of estoppel, the
issue of the validity of the nunc pro tune order or the issue
of which division of the District Court could hear Respondents' claim for attorneys' fees; nor have Appellants ever
made objection thereto until now.

In this regard, it suffices for the Respondents to point
out that issues and objections not raised at the trial level
may not be raised or asserted for the first time on appeal.
Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Improvement Dist.
No. 1, 15 U. 2d 216, 390 P. 2d 235; Tygesen v. Magna Water
District, 13 U. 2d. 397, 375 P. 2d 456; Carson v. Douglas,
12 U. 2d 424, 367 P. 2d 462; Drummond v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 111 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903.
Moreover, neither the issue of the claimed irregularity
of a hearing on attorneys' fees by a different division of the
lower court than the one originally hearing the matter, nor
the claim that the "judgment" was not supported by findings and conclusions, was designated by Appellants as a
point on appeal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 75 ( d),
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 87), and both were thus
waived on this appeal by Appellants. In reliance of Appellants' designation of points on appeal, the Respondents did
not have the entire record designated (R. 92-93) and were
prejudiced thereby.
For the foregoing reasons, none of the issues raised
in Appellants' Brief under Points III, IV or V are entitled
to consideration by this Court on appeal.
POINT III.
ACCEPTANCE OF PART PAYMENT AFTER
COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE
•
ACTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER
OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
Appellants assert that the Respondents waived their
right to attorneys' fees by a subsequent acceptance of installments under the mortgage after the commencement of
the action.
Initially, it is noteworthy that Respondents did no.t
accept any payments until after the Minute Entry of December 1961 had been entered. However, even if the Respondents had accepted an installment immediately after
the institution of foreclosure, the law is clear that acceptance of a part payment does not constitute a waiver of attorneys' fees. Uedelhofen v. Mason, 20 Ill. 465, 66 N. E.
364; Harris v. Whittier Building & Loan Assn., 18 Cal.
App. 2d 260, 63 P. 2d 840; Bisno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 714,
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346 P. 2d 814. Since the entire balance became due and
owing under the terms of the mortgage upon Appellants'
default (R. 5), th~ tender of any given installment was
merely a part payment, and as the court said in Sellman v.
Crosby, 20 Cal. App. 2d 562, 67 P. 2d 706, 707:

"* * * we are of the opinion that a creditor, at least in the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary, may accept partial payments on
the amount due without waiving the default as to
the balance and without affecting his rights under
the acceleration clause. In other words, no implied
waiver results from the mere acceptance of such
partial payments."
Jones, in his treatise on mortgages ha& stated that:
"Under a stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees in case a suit for foreclosure is brought,
payment or tender of payment of the Mortgage debt
after the bringing of the suit * * * does not
relieve the Mortgagor from his agreement." ( 3
Jones on Mortgages, §2059)
Applying this rule to the facts presently before the
Court, it can scarcely be said that an acceptance of installments after trial constitutes any more reason for finding a
waiver than acceptance of installments before trial.
Appellants have, in their Brief, raised another argument in support of a waiver: That Respondents did not
seek to enforce their claim for attorneys' fee for some four
years after the original trial. This argument is interwoven
with Appellants' de novo assertion of laches, and like laches,
was not raised in the trial court. Appellants' failure to
raise the issue there was grounded on good cause since they
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knew full well that after the foreclosure trial, the property
became subject to a Federal Bankruptcy proceeding, that
not until as late as 1964 were the original defendants' successors-in-interest appointed and that not until the time of
payment of the last installment in 1966 did any question of
entitlement to attorneys' fee arise between the parties (R.
50-52).
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY IS
NOT A JUDGMENT RENDERING THE ISSUE
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES RES JUDICATA AND
THUS NOT CONCLUSIVE ON THAT ISSUE.
The original trial court made no findings of fact or
conclusions of law and entered no formal written decree or
judgment. I ts purported ruling "no cause for action" is
found only in a Minute Entry in the Court's Docket Book.
Appellants have argued that the Minute Entry was
conclusive on the issue of attorneys' fees. The theory on
which this argument is based is unclear to the Respondents;
however, it is presumed that it is grounded on the principle
of res judicata.
Res judicata assumes the existence of a final judgment
which is, or at least purports to be dispositive of the issues
before the Court. In the present matter, there was no judgment, for, as this Court has ruled numerous times, a Minute
Entry is not a judgment, not a decree, and, consequently,
not conclusive or dispositive of anything. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P. 2d
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919; Robison v. Fillmore Commercial & Savings Bank, 61
Utah 398, 213 P. 790; Utah State Building Board v. Walsh
Plumbing Co., 16 U. 2d 249, 399 P. 2d 141.
These decisions are supported by Rule 58A ( c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
"A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes * * * when the same
is signed and filed as herein above provided."
Paragraph (b) of the same rule provides:

"* * * all judgments shall be signed by the
judge and filed with the clerk."
The doctrine of res judicata does not pertain until
there is a judgment which is dispositive of legal and factual
issues. There being no such judgment or decree here, it is
impossible, as a matter of basic legal theory, to say that the
doctrine of res judicata applied to preclude the issue of attorneys' fees.
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the Minute
Entry did constitute a judgment, it is contrary to the elementary policy reasons for the doctrine of res judicata to
contend that the Minute Entry purported to dispose of the
issue of attorneys' fees since it was left unresolved by any
term of or expression in the Minute Entry. Res judicata
applies only to those issues, both legal and factual, which
have been clearly disposed of on the face of the judgment.
Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P. 2d 390; Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, supra. Applying these
principles, it is unnecessary for a court to reserve for sub-
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sequent disposition, issues which have not been resolved
and of which disposition has not been made. Since the
issue of attorneys' fees was raised by the pleadings (R. 3)
and was not disposed of at the formal foreclosure trial, its
resolution was left open by the omission of any reference
thereto in the Court's Minute Record, and by the failure to
enter a judgment. Rule 54(b) appears to comport with
this proposition when it provides:

"* * * any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates less than all
the claims shall not terminate the action as to any
of the claims and the order or other form of decision
is subject to revision at any time before entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims."
The original trial judge, when confronted with the
issue by counsel for both parties, agreed that the matter of
attorneys' fees was to have been reserved, and went farther
than is required by Rule 54(b) by entering an order nunc
pro tune, with the consent of both parties, expressly reserving that issue (R. 82-83).

In the absence of a final and formal judgment, supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in
light of the manifestation of the original trial court's unmistakable intention to reserve that issue by the nunc pro
tune order, it cannot be said that the Minute Entry was
conclusive on or dispositive of the issue of attorneys' fees.
That issue was properly disposed of at the hearing from
which this appeal is taken.
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POINT V.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE NOT IN THIS INSTANCE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S
"JUDGMENT".
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellants have not
waived their present assertion that the lower court's award
of attorneys' fees was not supported by "sufficient" findings of fact and conclusions of law, by their failure to designate same as a point on this appeal, (See, Point II, supra),
the following is noted:
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part:
"In all actions tried * * * the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered * * * Findings of fact and conclusions'
of law are unnecessary on decision of motions under
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b) [pertaining to involuntary dismissal]." (Emphasis supplied.)
The issue of attorneys' fees was brought before the
lower court on Respondents' motion, which motion was in
the form of a "Petition for Attorneys' Fees" (R. 57-59).
Historically, a "petition" is a "written motion" for an
order of the court, the term "motion" - again historicallymeaning an "oral application" for an order of the court.
In re Levy's Estate, 46 A. 2d 82 (New Jersey); Shaft V.

19
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 67 New York
544. Thus:
"The principal distinction between motions and
petitions lies in the fact that motions * * *
may sometimes be made orally, while a petition is
always in writing." (Gibbs v. Ewing, 113 So. 730
(Fla.))
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(b)
( 1) , all motions "* * * unless made during a hearing
or trial, shall be made in writing * * *." By virtue of
that provision, the historical distinction between motions
and petitions is abrogated, and in our present practice "motion" and "petition" are two terms denoting a "written application" for a decision of the court. The Respondents'
petition, here in question, purports to be no more than a
written motion for a decision of the court establishing a
reasonable attorneys' fee in a still pending action (R. 5759).
Viewed in this perspective, the lower court went further than it was required to do in disposing of Respondents'
petition when it made the findings and conclusions that it
did, for none was required. The findings and conclusions
herein were a mere gratuity and Appellants' argument that
they were not sufficient means little in the light of the fact
that they were not even necessary.
As to the argument of Appellants that "any judgment
must be based upon findings of fact" (Appellants' Brief, p.
27), Respondents submit that this is not the law of Utah.
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Rule 54 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provijes:
"'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies

* * *"
"Since the Judgment" obtained here, and from which
this appeal is taken amounts to an order, in its terms and
effect, based on Respondents' "application," and since the
term "Judgment" includes an oder from which an appeal
lies, it makes little difference whether that particular document in question was denominated "Judgment" as it was
(R. 75), or "Order" as it could have been, so far as a requirement of findings and conclusions is concerned. The
essential question lies in the effect and not the name. As
noted above, finding and conclusion are not required for
·jecisions of motions, Rule 52 (a), supra. The "Judgment"
here was no more than a decision of a motion.
The cases cited by Appellants in support of their assertion either involve a "judgment" based upon all of the
pleadings and not merely upon a motion of one of the parties or are antedated by the Rules of Procedure, and, consequently, are not helpful or pertinent to the present question.
See, F. M. A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 U. 2d
80, 404 P. 2d 670, Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43,
278 P. 2d 285, In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269
P. 103.
Based upon the foregoing, Respondents submit that the
question of the sufficiency of the findings of fact anj con-
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clusions of law is nugatory when neither findings nor conclusions were required.
POINT VI.
THE DETERMINATION OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT $3,500.00 WAS A REASONABLE
ATTORNEYS' FEE DID NOT CONSTITUTE
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
As noted above under Point I, Section 78-37-9, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's
fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount thereof
shall be fixed by the court. * * *"
This section contemplates that a reasonable sum will
be awarded as an attorney's fee and that what constitutes
a reasonable sum must in each case be determined in the
discretion of the trial court. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45
Utah 320, 145 P. 1036. The factors which the court must
consider in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's
fee are the amount in controversy - here, in excess of
$90,000.00 - and the amount of labor and responsibility
imposed on the attorney - here, in excess of 190 hours.
Jens en v. Lichtenstein, supra.
In addition to the above facts, the lower court in this
matter was aided by the uncontroverted testimony of another attorney (R. 110-117) to the effect that, in light of
the labor, time and responsibilities involved in the prosecution of this foreclosure, a fee of $5,000.00 would be reason-
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able (R. 114). Moreover, a calculation of the fee granted
by the lower court, - $3,500.00 - divided by the total
hours spent - 192 - amounts to $18.00 per hour, which
is the minimum sum suggested by the Utah State Bar for
consultation and office work. Utah State Bar Advisory
Handbook on Office Management and Fees, page 19.
Under previous decisions of this Court, wherein fees
from ten per cent to seventy per cent of the amount in
question have been allowed as "reasonable," Jensen v. Lichtenstein, supra; Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 U. 2d 179, 407 P. 2d 141; Parkinson v. Amundson,
122 Utah 443, 2·50 P. 2d 944, it can scarcely be said that a
fee of less than four per cent of the amount in question is
unreasonable without some showing to that effect by the
Appellants. Having failed to overcome the evidence adduced by Respondents as to the reasonableness of the fee
by contrary testimony or evidence, the Appellants are not
now in a position to assert that the trial court abused its
discretion in making the award which it did. In light of the
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence upon which the
trial court based its decision, that decision should be sustained on this appeal as one grounded on the sound discretion of the Court in light of the evidence before it.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully submit that the determination of the lower court should be
affirmed in all respects on this appeal for the following
reasons:
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(1) Under the terms of the note and the mortgage
agreement, Respondents are entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee, said entitlement to an attorneys' fee being
conditioned on "default" or "foreclosure", both of which
conditions occurred.
(2) Appellants' defenses of laches, estoppel and
waiver were not asserted prior to this appeal. Likewise,
Appellants' present objection to a hearing by a different
judge from the one who originally heard the foreclosure, and
their objection to the issuance nunc pro tune order were
never asserted or made in the court below. None of these
matters may be raised for the first time on this appeal. In
the same category is their claim that the "judgment" from
which appeal is taken is not sufficiently supported by findings and conclusions since they failed to ·designate the same
as a point on appeal to the prejudice of Respondents.
(3) Appellants' assertion that Respondents waived
their right to attorneys' fees by acceptance of part payment
after commencement of the action is neither supported by
law, nor by the facts of the case since part payment was
not accepted until after the original trial.
( 4) The trial court's Minute Entry was not a "judgment" and the doctrine of res judicata does not, therefore,
apply to conclude the question of attorneys' fees. Moreover,
the issue of attorneys' fees was expressly reserved by an
order of the original judge, entered nunc· pro tune with the
consent of counsel for both parties.
(5) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
expressly not required for decisions on motions and thus,

I
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the argument that the findings and conclusions made and
entered here were insufficient is nugatory in light of the
fact that the lower court's ruling was a decision on Respondents' motion for attorneys' fees.
(6) The lower court's determination that $3,500.00
was a reasonable attorneys' fee is based on the sound discretion of said court; that determination should not be overturned without a showing of an abuse of discretion, which
showing the Appellants have failed to make here.
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS,BEHLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.,
520 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Respondents.

